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Abstract 
 
Venice is worldwide known as one of the most intriguing places, hosting an average of 15 million 
tourists per year. This paper describes the causes of the economical inefficiency of the freight 
transportation system in Venice, and analyses the problems caused by the damages done by the waves. A 
properly modified form of road pricing, aiming at improving the efficiency of the traffic chains by 
introducing the pressure of competition between the freight operators, is thereby conceived and the 
possible deriving scenarios are described. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A “peculiar” city of Arts has “peculiar” traffic problems and requires thereby a 
“peculiar” approach. In Venice, the increasing amount of freight boats causes an 
unsustainable wave motion which jeopardizes the survival of the foundations of the old 
buildings by the sides of some canals.  
After reviewing the past attempts to reduce the problem of the wave motion, this 
paper considers hereby the movement of the boats as a mere kinetic phenomenon, 
considering the effects of congestion and pollution ultimately not much relevant. 
Taking these preliminary remarks into account, a new traffic tool is conceived and 
thoroughly explained. The possible scenarios deriving from the effectiveness of the tool, 
and their consequences on the freight delivery system are analysed, leading to the 
conclusion that the intervention proposed in this paper should be possible, even in a 
such complex, “peculiar” background. 
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1.1 Short notes on the city  
 
An incessant, slow, physical metamorphosis has characterized Venice from its 
foundation till the present days, due both to the erosion produced by the sea and to the 
deposits carried by the rivers (Caniato et al., 1999). 
This evolution has led to several interventions, accomplished especially by the Venice 
Republic in the 18th century, meant to keep under control on the rivers of the region, to 
open new canals, to create the so-called “bocche di porto” (i.e. the openings that 
connect the sea and the lagoon), and other interventions to protect the seafront of the 
lagoon. 
The city changed along its history especially with the establishment of the railway 
bridge which connects the islands and the mainland (1846) and with the road bridge 
(1932): San Marco lost then its role of city headquarters becoming a tourist hotspot; the 
Arsenal and Salute dismissed their respective docking and duty roles. Unlikely, Rialto 
always kept its ancient role, having always been the commercial centre of Venice with 
markets and banks. The terminal of Piazzale Roma and the Tronchetto Island were also 
created as the new access gates for Venice, both for freight and for passengers. This 
area (Tronchetto, Piazzale Roma and the Rail Station, see figure 1) receives the 100.000 
people arriving daily in Venice, switching them to the public boat service. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Plan of the city of Venice. 
 
 
The transport network of the city is made from a central axis (Gran Canal) starting in 
Piazzale Roma and crossing the whole city up to San Marco, and a set of smaller canals 
which connect the Gran Canal with an external ring of greater canals surrounding the 
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whole city (Giudecca and Fondamenta Nove, figure 1). This network has never 
changed, despite the creation of Rio Novo (1933, in order to link more directly San 
Marco and Piazzale Roma) and the burial of some canals during the Austrian and 
French occupancy along the 19th century. 
 
 
1.2 Transportation issues in Venice 
 
The appearance of different kinds of motor boats in the lagoon is quite recent: the first 
motor boat for public transport appeared in 1881 and remained for a long period the 
only motorized typology allowed. The first private motor boats appeared later (1960s). 
They were mainly used for freight transport, and suddenly took control over the canals.  
Nowadays, several typologies (both for passengers and freight) are sharing the available 
water space. The boats for passengers are: 
 
- Public transport service, provided by the firm ACTV (Venice Transport Public 
Company), serving the stops spread in the city, whose allowed speed along the main 
canals (Gran Canal, Giudecca canal, Fondamenta Nove) is 11 km per hour. 
- Taxis, which are allowed to run at 20 km per hour on the external canals and 5-7 km 
per hour in the inner ones. These boats are smaller than the ACTV ones and are able 
to run along the smaller canals of the city. 
- Gondolas, divided in two categories: traghetti, used especially by Venetians, which 
link continuously the two banks of the Gran Canal, and the gondolas providing 
tourist sightseeing trips. There are no official estimations about the number of 
gondolas in use but they can roughly be considered around 500 units.  
- Private boats, used by hotels and cruise organizers collecting people at Tronchetto. 
 
The mobility network of Venice (both for passengers and freight) can not be 
compared with those of other cities (considering canals as roads), given the poor 
employment of boats for individual mobility and the very high ratio of foot-traffic.  
Besides, pollution and congestion are not to be seen as the main issues in the Lagoon 
of Venice: the boat traffic is not the main pollutant factor for Venice, as the pollution 
produced both from the chemical industries of Marghera and the vehicular traffic of 
Mestre (both on the mainland of Venice) is carried by the wind. On the other hand, 
congestion affects just the main canals in the rush hours.  
Unlike other cities, vehicles are then to be considered not as a pollutant, but as a 
kinetic concern. The boat traffic causes damages through the formation of waves, whose 
height depends on the speed and the tonnage of the boat, and on the section and the 
depth of the canals. The flow of boats produces mainly two forces on the banks: the first 
is caused by the waves directly generated by a boat itself (this is typical of smaller 
ships) and the second by the whirlpool of the seabed water (dominant for bigger boats). 
The waves cause a faster process of erosion, augmenting the porosity of the stones and 
the bricks that constitute the banks.  
The small amount of boats for passenger mobility and the review of some previous 
analyses (see also section 2.2) suggest to focus on the freight. 
The delivery of freight within the city is carried out by an oligarchy of carriers: a 
small percentage of this oligarchy uses private boats for transporting their own freights, 
while the greatest amount of the deliveries are carried out by transporters operating for 
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third party clients. Presently, there are about 400 licensed boats, but a large amount of 
unlicensed carriers is present in the city (almost 200 boats) 
This fleet is composed of boats different in terms of size and materials. These 
characteristics define the load capacity of the boats (defined for each ship at the 
registration). The most common boat for freight transport is the so-called “mototopo” 
(6-14 meters long, with a minimum 3.5 tonnage). 
Half of the fleet is equipped with peculiar features like freezers, safe-deposit boxes 
etc., while the other ships are often used for general freight transport and pony express 
deliveries (figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A typical Venetian boat used for freight transport. 
 
 
The logistic chain of Venice has its centre in San Giuliano, on the mainland, in the 
Tronchetto Island (the switching point with the road network) and in the Fondamenta 
Nove (figure 1). 
The shipments are mainly concentrated early in the morning and, leaving from the 
collecting points described above, concern the city centre, through the Gran Canal and 
the smaller canals. Different paths are followed according to the final destination: ships 
directed in the city centre from the railway station follow the Gran Canal up to Rialto. 
The ones directed in the areas between Rialto and San Marco follow the Rio Novo. The 
Rio Novo is one of the busiest canals, counting up to 1800 passages per day of freight 
boats (60% of the overall boats passing through the Rio Novo - Coses, 2003).  
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Nearby Piazzale Roma, the railway bridge represents a hot spot for the ring 
navigation. This is due to its height, which does not allow the transit of big boats, and 
force them to transit in the Gran Canal in front of the rail station (2100 passages per 
day, Coses, 2003), extending significantly the length of each trip (Coses 2002a, 2002b, 
and 2003). The latest surveys showed an increase of 40% of the boat passages between 
2001 and 2002 (Coses 2002a, 2002b, and 2003). 
A very weak competition among the shipment companies, which apply flat rates 
reflecting a standard fare for all the operators, comes out from this picture. An external 
tax, evaluated according to the principles described further in the paper (with the free-
of-charge tolls given to the shippers and the possibility of selling them back to the 
public administration) would cause a change in the actual non-competitive stuck 
situation. 
 
 
1.3 Previous attempts to solve the problem of the wave motion 
 
The economical and traffic systems of the city of Venice have already been object of 
numerous studies: a staff of Worcester Polytechnic Institute led by Dr Fabio Carrera 
promoted a study within the UNESCO project “Venice inner canals” to evaluate how to 
reduce the damages for the shopkeepers caused by the closing of the canals for their 
extraordinary maintenance.  
The proposal of Carrera, developed in three different publications (Carrera, 1999a, 
1999b & 2005), assigned to a public corporation (which was later identified with the 
municipality of Venice) the coordination of the contracts for the deliveries, which were 
to be granted to the lowest bidder. This would have caused a zone-oriented (instead of 
the present product-oriented) distribution, reducing the amount of circulating boats and 
thereby the wave motion.  
The increase in the number of landing places in the islands and a different 
management of the warehouses would have allowed to reschedule the deliveries with 
less on-board and more ashore workers.  
The researches of Coses (2002a, 2002b, and 2003), and Insula (2002) offered the 
numerical surveying, upon them several strategies for solving the problems related to 
the mobility (such as speed limits, traffic restricted areas, specific hours of accessibility, 
one-way canals and so on). Most of them failed because they were not negotiated with 
the subjects involved. 
The authorities dealing with boat traffic have been recently unified in the so called 
“Governor’s supervisor for Wave Motion”, aimed at “facing the emergency occurred in 
the City of Venice, in its lagoon and in the sea canals”. 
The Governor’s supervisor identified the new proposals for interventions defined by 
the Traffic Restricted Zones regulation (17 June 2005): according to the greater or 
smaller section of the canals and the weakness of the environments, the supervisor for 
the traffic within the Venetian Lagoon has defined the new speed limit along the canals 
(figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Speed limits in the Lagoon after the decision of the Government’s supervisor for the traffic. 
 
In spite of this rule, the problem of the wave motion does not seem to be solved: only 
the smaller canals gained advantage from the limitation to the passage of motorboats. 
The new rule has not changed much the traffic in the other canals, mostly due to the 
deficiency of a concrete policy in the freight movements. 
 
 
2. Description of the pricing tool and its effects on the lagoon 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The pricing tool considered in this section is part of a wider plan, containing several 
proposals meant to solve the problematic transportation system within the Lagoon of 
Venice, and meant to reduce the impact of the waves. 
In order to keep control on the mileage covered by boats, a direct equivalence 
between mileage and money is proposed. A credit is defined as the right to cover a 
length unit, identified as a canal between two check points. 
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2.2 Choice of the freight boat as target 
 
The 35-40% of the total distances daily covered within the canals is run by freight 
ships (Coses 2002a, 2002b, and 2003). As a consequence, the attention has to be 
focused on the freight boats: their number and their size makes them chiefly responsible 
for the formation of waves. 
Previous studies (Carrera 1999a, 1999b, and 2005) and the analysis of the current 
state have underlined a wide margin of optimization for both the delivery paths and the 
load ratios of the ships, since the actual ratio is lower than the 60% of the maximal 
tonnage.  
The total mileage of the paths followed by freight boats could be cut down at the 20% 
of the distances currently covered (Carrera, 2005). This inefficiency is due to several 
reasons: 
- a “product-oriented” delivery principle: each kind of good required by a store is 
delivered by a different shipper (e.g.: a brand of beer is distributed by one boat at 
several bars in Venice, while a second boat ships other kinds of beverages at the same 
bars, a third one ships food, and so on); 
- A large amount of empty trips: the incomes of shippers are much higher than the 
fuel price and thereby they are not encouraged to improve the paths of their deliveries; 
- A society based on close personal relations: shippers use every day the same bar and 
the same restaurant for their lunch, no matter in which part of the city they are at lunch 
time. 
A “natural” suggestion for the pricing tool would then drive towards an increase of 
load ratios and a different choice of the paths of the freight boats.  
 
 
2.3 Proposal for an innovative road pricing tool 
 
This particular road pricing system implies the application of road pricing on the 
network of canals that constitute the road system of Venice (figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4: Canal network in Venice and location of the check points (in red). 
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Differently from other cases, in which the check points are located along the 
perimeter of the city, in this pricing system the check-points are extended along the 
whole net of canals with a hot spot distribution having increased density along the most 
sensitive banks (meant to preserve them from the destroying effects of the waves).  
The solution proposed is meant to keep control over the rates applied to each 
shipment; this is a particular deal within Venice as far as the high costs of transport are 
declared to be the reason of the high prices applied in the city compared with the same 
products sold in the mainland.  
With the aim of avoiding an immediate rise of the fares, the procedure gives any 
shipper an amount of free-of-charge tolls, the amount of which is calculated with the 
procedure described in section 2.5. This amount can be increased by buying permits 
from the government/system administrator, whenever needed.  
The innovative aspect of this proposal is the possibility of either selling back each 
year the unused tolls to the administration, or keeping them for a future use. The income 
gained aims at promoting an optimization of the paths travelled, in order to save as 
many credits as possible. 
Better delivery trips, a higher load ratio, and, above all, an effort for a different 
delivery procedure, would change the present product-oriented (“one good – one 
shipper”) shipment in a destination-based one (see section 2.2).  
The only subject allowed to buy back someone’s unused credits is the public 
administration: this avoids speculations (e.g. people forced by someone to sell them 
their unused credit at an excessively low price), which would make the pricing tool 
ineffective.  
The free tolls must be distributed by the public administration, considering an existing 
division within the carriers: the pricing tool will affect only the ones who convey freight 
mainly within the City Centre, avoiding those running through external canals.  
A period of 20 years is considered suitable for reaching the goals proposed from this 
tool. Considering the difficulty of improving the supply chain within a shipping 
enterprise, a function is required to establish an appropriate schedule in the distribution 
of the free tolls (see following section 2.4). This function is represented by a concave 
curve. Since the first years have a higher improvement margin, the optimization rate is 
set at 15% for the first two years and then is decreased progressively every 5 years. The 
limit of this curve is set at the value corresponding to the 20% of the distances covered 
nowadays. This value is increased by 2,5% each year according to the increasing tax of 
freight transportation in Italy (Cappelli et al., 2005). 
 
 
2.4 Description of the procedure adopted to assign the free of charge tolls 
 
In this section the schedule of application of the pricing tool will be described, 
focussing onto the method used to calculate the free tolls distributed each year. 
The first year of application (year 0) will be used for placing the check-point gates 
and for providing the shippers with the equipment to be installed on the boats. Other 
important tasks carried out in year 0 are awakening the shippers and collecting the data 
required for calculating the amount of free tolls to distribute the following year. The 
distances covered during year 0 are computed by analyzing the receipts compiled by the 
shippers for each delivery, which will contain the exact list of the canals used. The 
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mileage covered corresponds to the amount of credits that the shipper would have used 
if the pricing tool had already been applied.  
According to this basic value, on year 1, which is the first year of real application of 
the pricing tool, the function adopted provides a total amount of credits that corresponds 
to the 110% of the distances covered on year 0. 
The increase provided is meant to avoid a limit in the companies’ commercial growth 
by the tax eventually caused. The efficiency of the pricing tool for year 1 is measured 
through the effort of the shippers in saving the greater amount of free tolls, which, if 
sold back to the public administration, would produce an additional income in the 
company’s financial balance. 
The next year (year 2) the amount of free tolls distributed to each operator is lowered 
of 15% (93,5% of the distances covered during year 0). The constructive part of the 
pricing tool begins here: the shippers, aiming at keeping their commercial share, are 
forced to improve their logistic efficiency, in order to avoid the payment of the 
additional mileage covered. The improvement, which implies the reduction of 6,5% of 
the distances run compared with year 0, could be achieved just avoiding the unpaid trips 
(the ones covered for leisure or for a private use). The unused tolls are sold back as 
well. 
 
 
2.5 Possible scenarios: success, failure and expected results 
 
The total expense for the public administration (besides the costs for the equipment 
and its maintenance) is given by the success or failure of the pricing experience.  
The following formula explains the economical sustainability of the tool proposed 
here by expressing the income (or the costs) for the public administration: 
 
( ) ( ) 

 +⋅

 −⋅−= ∑
=
i
i
N
i
ii rKptgtF 1
1
       (1) 
where: 
 
F:  income or costs for the public administration; 
N:  amount of years taken into account; 
ti:  amount of tolls used in year i; 
tgi:  amount of free tolls distributed in year i; 
pi:  price of a free toll in year i; 
K:  fixed payments (equipment, maintenance etc.) 
r:  current interest rate 
 
The case of a total inefficiency of the procedure (the shippers keep on travelling the 
canals without any logistic improvement, making the final customers pay for the 
additional tolls bought) is considered in figure 5: in this case, the income for the public 
administration would be given by formula (1), considering a rising in the mileage 
covered according to the general increasing in freight transport. 
This result can also be drawn from figure 5, considering the quantity (ti – tgi) as the 
difference between a black and a white column at a given year i.  
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Figure 5: Description of the worst result of the tool. 
 
Formula (1) can describe the opposite outcome as well. A perfect response of the 
operators (figure 6) would mean that the actually covered mileage reaches immediately 
the minimum possible value, which, according to previous studies (Carrera, 2005), can 
be estimated as the 20% of the current one. The public administration will face in this 
case a total cost given by the purchase of the free tolls distributed and not used, being tgi 
(white columns) lower than ti (black columns). 
 
Description of the optimal result
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 [n
um
be
r o
f a
cc
es
se
s/
nu
m
be
r o
f a
cc
es
se
s 
at
 y
ea
r 0
] Free of toll
Effective
 
Figure 6: Description of the optimal result of the tool in the best desired scenario. 
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Figures 5 and 6 represent two polar, opposite situations, but at the same time show 
clearly that the main issues of the pricing tool proposed here are the price paid by the 
shippers for an extra toll and the one paid by the administration for buying the unused 
tolls back.  
In case of an excessively low price for the extra tolls, compared with the delivery 
fares adopted, the tendency would probably be similar to the first described scenario. It 
would mean no improvement in the supply chain: the shippers would keep on with the 
present delivering procedures.  
On the contrary, an excessive price would cause the paradox of a complete stop of all 
the delivery operations, due to the fact that the shippers would consider more 
remunerative to stop their boats and sell all the credits back to the public administration 
(with the obvious consequences for the city). 
A moderate toll price would produce the desired intermediate scenario: a substantial 
and progressive increasing of the logistic chain, in which the most of the operators 
would be located around the toll-refund line. Some of them would optimize their 
deliveries optimizing the load ratio of the ships and taking advantage by the final return 
of the unused tolls. Other transporters would instead be forced to buy a few more tolls, 
being unable to optimize their supply chain (figure 7). 
 
Realistic outcome of the project
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Figure 7: Representation of the realistic outcome of the tool. 
 
The red line in figure 7 represents the same function of distribution of free credits, as 
the one expressed from the white column in the figures 5 and 6. The blue lines try to 
predict the behaviour of the shippers, who are expected to be closer and closer to the red 
tendency, as the pricing tool becomes established. 
This gap in the final income (effective income plus refunding of the unused tolls or 
effective income minus price paid for buying additional tolls) will improve the 
competition within the sector, which is almost nonexistent nowadays. The ones who 
spare miles will be able to lower their rates in order to attract new users, as far as they 
can have benefits by selling their unused tolls back. The others, unable to save tolls, will 
on the contrary face additional costs given by the extra credits bought; as a 
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consequence, they will increase their fares running out of market, which will force them 
to improve their logistics for the next year.  
The analysis of figures 5 and 6 has not to be considered in mere economical terms: 
also environmental aspects play a role in the overall consideration of the effects. Venice 
would gain from the tool in any case: in the polar, worst case (figure 5) the inefficiency 
of the tool would be rewarded by some extra money, which the municipality could 
invest in a more frequent maintenance of the banks. In the opposite, best case (figure 6), 
the tool would effectively reduce the mileage covered by the boats and then directly the 
erosion of the banks. In the more realistic, intermediate scenarios described in figure 7, 
the total expenses for the public administration would be the maintenance of the 
equipment, as the tolls refunded would be almost equal to the additional tolls sold. 
The optimal distribution of the check points must be evaluated carefully, in order not 
to worsen the accessibility of some inner areas of the city, but for avoiding the crossing 
of those areas for the delivery of small amounts of goods.  
For this reason, a maintenance of the free access in the external canals (Giudecca 
Island and Fondamenta Nove – see figure 1) is proposed, aiming at moving the trips 
connecting the opposites parts of Venice to the less vulnerable areas. This is to be 
achieved through: 
- The creation of a logistic centre located on Tronchetto Island; 
- A stronger policy of controls and penalties; 
- An educational program for improving both the load ratio of boats and the logistics. 
The cause of the present disorganization is not to be found only within the 
transporters, although they are responsible for a general lack in the observation of rules 
and technical progress. The public administration is guilty as well, since it was not able 
to find an alternative, suitable location for the logistic centre of Tronchetto (the first 
projects were developed in 1980 – TransCare, 2003) and has not arranged financial aids 
for the renewal of the fleets (the most of the boats are from the seventies and many of 
the others even from the sixties).  
Also some shop holders share a portion of responsibility, as they swapped large social 
external costs for small private incomes. 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
This paper sums up different measures of intervention on the urban mobility system, 
belonging in the literature to the two main topics of "Road Pricing" and "City 
Logistics". 
Particular originality and complexity are imposed by the area of application, i.e. the 
city of Venice, in which the mobility through water canals determines externality and 
needs therefore more complex control systems. 
The pricing tool described here has the objective of modifying the status quo of the 
organization of the freight movement in the lagoon, with the aim of introducing the 
pressure of competition between the operators, who nowadays operate in a sheltered 
market system with low efficiency. 
Because of the weakness of the ecological system and the strong rootedness of 
oligopolistic customs, the developed system needs to be tested (in its first year of 
application, always referred to as "year zero" in the previous sections), in order to 
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calibrate the elasticity of demand, the yearly percentage of optimization of the mobility 
(i.e. the obtained reduction of the traffic flows) and the final objective of its total 
reduction (i.e. the level of reachable efficiency). 
The conditions of feasibility of the intervention are in any case comparable with those 
of similar initiatives, with the only complication of dealing with a segment of market 
rather closed to external measures of rationalization, and which has been accustomed in 
the years "to take advantage" of the particular economical and urban conditions of the 
lagoon of Venice. 
The analysis of the possible scenarios, however, leads to the conclusion that the 
margin of action of this pricing tool has to be estimated as significant, and by all means 
greater than the ones present in comparable situations in the traditional city areas, being 
the current state of freight transport demand far away from efficiency. This 
consideration leads to the conclusion that this intervention should be feasible even in a 
complex background such as Venice. 
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